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THE PITFALLS OF PROFESSIONALIZED PROSECUTION:  
A RESPONSE TO JOSH BOWERS’S “LEGAL GUILT, 
NORMATIVE INNONCENCE, AND THE EQUITABLE 
DECISION NOT TO PROSECUTE” 
Stephanos Bibas* 
Response to:  Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655 (2010). 
Prosecutors wield tremendous power in deciding whom to charge.  
Scholars focus on the most visible injustices, as when police arrest, and 
prosecutors pursue, capital defendants who turn out to be factually 
innocent of murder.
1
  But as Josh Bowers rightly notes, the sliver of 
visible, serious felonies is dwarfed by the mountain of minor, low-
visibility misdemeanors and violations.
2
  Prosecutors are reasonably good 
at classifying crimes based on legal guilt and on administrative criteria, 
such as how much time and effort they will have to invest.  In Bowers’s 
evocative terms, they are good at thinking inside the box, at putting cases 
into legal pigeonholes.  They are much worse, however, at thinking 
outside the box, at weighing all the particulars and exercising equitable 
discretion.
3
  Our consistent faith in prosecutors’ expertise, Bowers 
argues, is not only misguided, but backwards; we should value outsiders’ 
fresh perspectives over insiders’ jaded expertise.
4
  In Part I of this 
response, I largely praise Bowers’s diagnoses of the illness.  It is far easier 
to diagnose a malady than to treat it, however.  Thus, Part II then presses 
Bowers on possible solutions and offers a few of my own. 
 
* Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Thanks to Josh Bowers for our 
fruitful conversations on these topics. 
1. See generally Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld & Jim Dwyer, Actual Innocence:  When 
Justice Goes Wrong and How to Make It Right (2003) (chronicling stories of innocent 
defendants sentenced to death for felonies). 
2. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to 
Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655 (2010). 
3. Id. at 1689–92. 
4. Id. 
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I.  PROSECUTORS’ BLINDERS, OR THINKING INSIDE THE BOX 
Bowers’s Article is illuminating in many ways.  Most obviously, his 
typology of legal, administrative, and equitable discretion makes us think 
about what prosecutors are doing and what their strengths are.  In an 
overcriminalized system, where almost everyone is factually guilty of 
something, prosecutors effectively decide who deserves punishment and 
how much.  Such deeply moral issues of desert are ones that busy, legal-
minded prosecutors are ill-suited to decide unilaterally. 
Moreover, Bowers eschews hackneyed criticisms of bad apples and 
overzealous prosecutors.  He specifically avoids imputing “bad faith or ill 
will” to prosecutors.
5
  His focus is a modern, institutional one on police 
and prosecutors’ incentives, mindsets, and procedures for charging, plea 
bargaining, and the like.  Yet he is not seduced by the fantasy that 
bureaucratic reforms can turn prosecutors into adjudicators.
6
  The 
solution to overprosecution and overcriminalization lies not in enacting 
yet another law, but in bringing a fresh perspective and commitment to 
equitable particularism in law.  Bowers argues powerfully that on this 
account, discretion and mercy perfect justice, rather than undercut it.
7
  
He likewise defends a measure of informalism in law, as against the 




Another welcome aspect of Bowers’s Article is its effort to reconnect 
criminal procedure with foundational issues of blameworthiness.  As I 
have repeatedly argued, for too long criminal procedure has been 
divorced from the substantive justifications for punishment that it is 
supposed to serve.
9
  By focusing on who morally deserves prosecution, 
Bowers seeks to reorient procedures to serve the values of substantive 
criminal law. 
Bowers’s vision of justice is not new, but quite old.  The common 
law depended on juries to inject the community’s moral views into 
justice.  Now that plea bargaining has all but displaced juries, the 
challenge is to find other ways to recreate lay roles within a 
professionalized system. 
At points I think Bowers is too hard on the approach of police and 
prosecutors.  After all, many a neighborhood is ruined by quality of life 
offenses, causing law-abiding residents to flee and letting the remainder 
of the neighborhood slide into chaos.  As Randall Kennedy has argued, 
 
5. Id. at 1660. 
6. Cf. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham 
L. Rev. 2117, 2123–51 (1998) (envisioning such a system based on internal system of 
appeals in white-collar criminal cases in U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of 
New York). 
7. Bowers, supra note 2, at 1669–73, 1680–83. 
8. Id. at 1673–78. 
9. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and 
Criminal Procedure:  The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 
1361, 1362–64, 1389, 1400–08 (2003). 
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minority communities ought to worry about underenforcement that 
leaves their communities unprotected.
10
  Hostility to minor charges 
could impede this valuable enforcement.  Yet, it is not easy to devise 
mechanisms cheap enough, fast enough, and workable enough to check 
the myriad charges filed in the most minor cases. 
I also find Bowers’s use of New York and Iowa’s declination statistics 
far from compelling.  Sure, prosecutors are less likely to decline charges 
based on police testimony than those based on civilian witnesses, and 
they are less likely to decline minor than major cases.
11
  So what?  It is 
entirely rational to weigh the likelihood of conviction and the victim’s 
wishes where there is a victim.  Without much more information, we 
cannot know whether the problems of civilian complaining witnesses are 
substantial enough to warrant declinations in most of those cases.  And 
of course prosecutors invest more time and effort in screening major 
cases; any rational system would spend far more where felony convictions 
and imprisonment are on the line. 
Though Bowers criticizes lawyers’ formalism as “infantil[e]” or 
“childish[],”
12
 prosecutors and judges are just doing their jobs.  Justice 
Scalia might fairly reply that he is supposed to uphold “the rule of law as 
a law of rules.”
13
  Justice Scalia would be the first to admit that formalist 
judging is itself less flexible, but the point of formalism is to constrain his 
undemocratic discretion.  Formalists would say that needed discretion 
and equity in the system ought to be the job of jurors.
14
  The problem is 
not that judges or prosecutors are misbehaving, but that there are no 
jurors or other laymen left to counterbalance them.  The 
professionalization of the assembly line has removed these vital checks 
and balances. 
II.  LOOSENING PROFESSONALS’ MONOPOLY ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Unfortunately, it is far easier to diagnose a chronic disease than to 
cure it.  Bowers tantalizes us by referring repeatedly to his next article 
without giving us a preview of what fixes he plans to propose.
15
  One is 
left to wonder about various possibilities.  
One problem Bowers notes is that prosecutors have too little 
information early on to gauge the equities of individual cases.
16
  A few 
prosecutors’ offices respond to this problem by having specialized 
screening units conduct early, probing investigations and assessments of 
 
10. Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law 19–20 (1997). 
11. Bowers, supra note 2, at 1712–20. 
12. Id. at 1690–91. 
13. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1176–
80 (1989). 
14. See id. at 1180–81. 
15. Bowers, supra note 2, at 1661 & n.21, 1672 n.70, 1676 n.91, 1687 n.144, 1688 
n.148, 1698 n.197, 1724 n.330, 1725 & n.335. 
16. Id. at 1701–02. 
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the proper charges.
17
  Granted, these systems primarily have been used to 
screen out cases for legal and administrative reasons, but perhaps they 
could be used for equitable screening as well.  Early investigations and 
screening systems might not be practical for the large-volume, low-
seriousness dockets Bowers addresses, however.  Also, improved 
prosecutorial screening systems would still be staffed by jaded 
prosecutors, albeit ones with fewer self-interests in hoarding plea-
bargaining chips to avoid trial.
18
 
Bowers notes other specific problems with insiders’ incentives, such 
as arrest quotas and awards.
19
  To some extent, one could mitigate these 
problems by changing the metrics of success.  I have suggested moving to 
an eBay-style reputational feedback system, with awards, rewards, and 
promotions tied to peer and customer satisfaction, rather than arrests 
and charges.
20
  But these solutions, too, would amount to tinkering.  
They could pare down some of the excesses prized by our quantity-
crazed punishment assembly line, but at root, the systems would still be 
run by insiders and dominated by their quantity mindset. 
The root problem here is that our system punishes in the name of 
the community, but prosecutors and other insiders imperfectly represent 
the community.  They think they are doing justice by formalistically 
treating like cases alike; formal equality is an article of faith among 
lawyers.
21
  But lawyers, paralyzed by fear of discrimination, overrate rule-
bound equality.  And in learning to think like lawyers, we grow callous, 
much as emergency room doctors do.  The trick is to see our own 
blindness, to marry laymen’s freshness to lawyers’ expertise.  It will 
require large structural reforms to bring laymen back into power as a 
check.  Bowers hints that he wants to include laymen at charging, 
whereas I would find a way to empower laymen at sentencing, by giving 
sentencing juries greater leeway notwithstanding the constraints of plea 
bargains.
22
  Either way, however, he has set himself a huge but important 
task.  The trick will be pulling it off in our cash-strapped, overwhelmed 
criminal justice system. 
 
17. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 Stan. L. 
Rev. 29, 61–65 (2003) (noting New Orleans District Attorney’s Office under Harry 
Connick, Sr. pioneered this early screening approach). 
18. Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and 
Defense Function 3-3.4, at 61–62 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing desirability of experienced 
prosecutors staffing screening units). 
19. Bowers, supra note 2, at 1695. 
20. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 
157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 1011–15 (2009); Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for 
Performance, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 441, 443–47 (2009). 
21. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice:  Criminal Punishment and the 
Widening Divide Between America and Europe 13 (2003) (“[T]he strong tendency of the 
last twenty-five years has been toward a formal equality of nearly Kantian severity . . . . 
[W]e display a powerful drive to hit every offender equally hard.”). 
22. See Stephanos Bibas, Assembly-Line Criminal Justice (forthcoming 2011) 
(proposing creation of lay sentencing juries, which would consider plea bargains' 
sentencing recommendations but ultimately decide for themselves what sentences to 
impose). 
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